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Abstract
This paper posits a novel resource policy for the resource-rich southern Italian region of
Basilicata. The policy consists of establishing a regionally owned wealth fund (the Basilicata
Wealth Fund), in which royalty revenues from natural resources in Basilicata can be stored as
low-risk nancial assets. The paper pins down and simulates the dynamics of di¤erent scal
expenditure rules. The Basilicata Wealth Fund strengthens long-run economic development
and fosters higher accountability, hence avoiding misuse of resource revenues for myopic scal
spending. The Basilicata Wealth Fund constitutes a novel approach that can be followed by
other resource-rich regions.
Keywords: Resource policy, Regional wealth fund, Basilicata, Resource windfall.
JEL codes O13, Q32, R11, R58.
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to put forward a new economic policy approach for the resource-
rich southern Italian region of Basilicata, which can also be adopted by other resource-rich
regions or federal states in the world. In other words, this paper aims at contributing to the
growing literature of within-country political economy of natural resources, recently surveyed
by CUST and POELHEKKE (2015).
The recent empirical studies of PERCOCO (2012), IACONO (2015), VICCARO et al.
(2015), ROCCHI et al. (2015) and BIASI (2015), all point in the direction of missing or neg-
ligible positive e¤ects from oil extraction activity in Basilicata. PERCOCO (2012) exploits a
geographical Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in order to obtain the causal e¤ects of
almost two decades (1991  2008) of large-scale oil extraction on per capita extra enterprise
creation. The results show a positive e¤ect of 0; 01 per capita extra rms, connected to a
rather modest increase in employment of 2500 labour units. Complementary to the study of
PERCOCO (2012), the quantitative comparative case study by IACONO (2015) estimates
the general equilibrium e¤ects of oil extraction activity and royalty revenues (1980 2009) on
the Basilicata regional economy. IACONO (2015) implements the Synthetic Control Method
(SCM) in order to construct a data-driven comparison unit to the treated region of Basili-
cata, and conrms that the causal e¤ects on a set of regional macroeconomic variables (real
GDP per capita, employment rates and gross xed investments) are negligible. The studies
by VICCARO et al. (2015) and ROCCHI et al. (2015) construct a multi-sector model of the
Basilicata region built on a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), in order to analyze the poten-
tial impact on regional development (on both economic growth and distributive aspects) of
the allocation of royalty revenues (1997 2013). Results show here as well that the impact of
oil earnings on the regional economy have been far away from being substantial, despite the
huge quantity of additional nancial resources channeled into regional development policies.
VICCARO et al. (2015) and ROCCHI et al. (2015) jointly conclude that a more productive
use of resource revenues at the level of regional government might have resulted in stronger
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regional growth and higher employment rates. Another study by BIASI (2015) provides
an estimation of the genuine savings dynamics for the region of Basilicata as compared to
other regions of Italy, showing clearly that extraction of natural capital combined with un-
productive revenue spending diminishes the overall sustainability of the process of regional
economic development. To sum up, all these empirical studies converge on the conclusion
that the past allocation of royalty revenues, mostly allocated to short-run social spending in
these rst couple of decades of resource exploitation, has been detrimental to the economic
development of the region.
Hence, the consensus which emerges from these empirical studies calls for a brand new
economic policy approach in order to give priority to long-run investments and to better
exploit revenues from extraction of natural capital. The rst and main contribution of this
paper is to put forward and analyze such an approach. The policy proposal is to establish
a (regional) sovereign wealth fund in which all the royalty revenues from non-renewable
natural resource exploitation in Basilicata would be stored and fully converted into low-risk
nancial assets. For the sake of simplicity and in order to be consistent with the title of
this paper, the fund will be labeled as the Basilicata Wealth Fund (BWF, hereafter). The
BWF would be a regionally owned investment fund, however independently administered
from national authorities (for instance, as an independent legal entity under the jurisdiction
of the Bank of Italy). This institutional framework does not substantially deviate from the
current institutional framework, in which the region of Basilicata receives the 100% of the
royalty revenues paid from extracting companies to the Italian State (IACONO, 2015).
In addition, a transparent and clear-cut spending scal rule should be designed in order
to let regional authorities use the resource revenues to nance economic development objec-
tives. The simplest benchmark scal rule could be such that, for each given year, the regional
government is allowed to use the annuity value of the nancial wealth accumulated in the
To the best of our knowledge, the only research conducted on the creation of regionally owned funds has
been conducted by BRAUN-MUNZINGER (2009), who analyzed how these funds can help to implement
the EU and European member statesAid for Trade (AfT) commitments.
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BWF. Deviations from this straightforward rule might also be conceived, for instance allow-
ing larger spending in di¢ cult times, as for example the Chilean scal rule does (MARCEL
et al., 2001). An intermediate and more general scal rule will be introduced and simulated
in the course of the paper. In any case, the clear advantage from the BWF and from a trans-
parent scal spending rule would be the stronger focus on long-run economic development
and the higher accountability (hence avoiding misuse of resource revenues for myopic scal
spending). An additional novelty aspect of the economic policy approach proposed in this
paper, is that establishing a wealth fund at the regional level has not been tried before and
could be considered as a new policy option for other resource-rich regions in the world.
That being said, the main scope of this paper is to put forward and analytically present
the core theoretical features of this new approach for the exploitation of resource revenues,
in addition to some model simulations. In other words, this work is neither aimed at econo-
metrically forecasting the economic e¤ects of this approach, nor it is aimed at pinning down
the precise institutional framework in which this policy proposal should landy. Both of these
analyses would be destined to future research.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces the theory and practice of sovereign
wealth funds, section 3 applies the analytical framework to the case of the Basilicata region,
whilst section 4 concludes.
The analytical framework
The aim of this section is to analytically unfold the policy of establishing the Basilicata
Wealth Fund. At rst, the benchmark analytical model of the fund will be presented, by
pinning down the scal spending rule formulation and the resulting fund dynamics. In
addition, a more general spending rule will be presented, based on a combination of both
the actual rule and the spending rule with the fund.
yFor a detailed operational "roadmap" in order to analyze when and how setting up a sovereign wealth
fund, see ANG (2010) and DAS et al. (2009).
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The main scope behind a wealth fund is to boost the long-run impact of current resource
revenues. In other words, the wealth fund postpones the use of the resource revenues by
smoothing their spending path. Let us describe the features of the analytical framework
behind the wealth fund, similarly to the model developed in IACONO (2012).
The BWF would for instance prescribe that the entire income from royalty revenues for a
given year Rt (with RT = 0 due to resource depletion at t = T ) be stored and converted into
low-risk nancial assets (r is the constant net interest rate). Dening as Abwft the amount of
resource wealth allocated in the BWF, it gives the following fund dynamics in discrete time:
Abwft+1 = (1 + r)
h
Abwft +Rt   gbwft
i
; (1)
in which gbwft is the regional government scal spending rule. The simplest stylized formu-
lation of the scal spending rule is the following:
gbwft =

r
1 + r

Abwft ; (2)
in which
 
r
1+r

Abwft represents the annuity value of the nancial wealth accumulated in
the BWF; i.e., the regional government would be allowed to consume only the return on
nancial wealth which has been previously invested. The scal spending rule in (2) draws
heavily on the actual Norwegian spending rule linked to the Norwegian sovereign wealth
fund (HARDING and VAN DER PLOEG, 2013). It is relevant to remind that deviations
from the rather conservative benchmark scal spending rule gbwft can be agreed, in order to
allow higher spending at times.
As opposed to that, the current scal spending rule of the regional government of Basil-
icata is basically given by:
gt = Rt: (3)
A rst clear advantage of the scal spending rule given in (2) with respect to the actual
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spending rule in (3), is that once exhaustible resources are depleted at t = T (and hence,
RT = 0), regional government expenditure will still be positive due to previously accumulated
nancial wealth:
gbwfT > gT = RT = 0: (4)
The clear-cut formulation of the scal spending rule gbwft in (2) was chosen as well in
order to enhance analytical tractability: gbwft can be now inserted back into (1) in order to
get:
Abwft+1 = (1 + r)

Abwft +Rt  

r
1 + r

Abwft

; (5)
Abwft+1 = A
bwf
t + (1 + r)Rt: (6)
For the sake of completeness, I will now solve the di¤erence equation given in (6), which
gives:
Abwft = A
bwf
0 + (1 + r)
t 1X
s=0
Rs: (7)
As it can be seen from (7), in the post-depletion period we have AbwfT+s = A
bwf
T , with
(s = 1; ::; n), due to RT = 0. By substituting the last result from (7) back into the BWF
spending rule (2), we obtain a formulation of the scal spending rule gbwft which is a function
of exclusively exogenous terms, precisely the entire stream of royalty revenues
Pt 1
s=0Rs and
the initial condition for the wealth fund given by Abwf0 :
gbwft =
r
1 + r
"
(1 + r)
t 1X
s=0
Rs + A
bwf
0
#
: (8)
In conclusion, the main feature of the BWF spending rules exemplied in (2, 8) is that
scal spending at time t is no longer strictly depending on the uncertain stream of resource
revenues deriving from royalty payments. In other words, current scal spending will be now
a fraction of the size of the nancial wealth Abwft previously accumulated in the BWF.
5
The mixed rule
This subsection aims at developing a third and more general scal spending rule, which
encompasses aspects from both the actual spending rule and the BWF rule. This will be
named as the mixed rule hereafter. The target is to design a more pragmatic rule with a
lower degree of conservatism than the BWF rule, and which is a function of the economic
development of the region.
The mixed rule prescribes that only a fraction of the entire income from royalty revenues
for a given year Rt be stored in the BWF. The formulation of the mixed scal spending rule
is the following:
gmt =

 + 

govt 1
yt 1

Rt +

r
1 + r

Amt ; (9)
in which  = [0; 1] is a parameter indicating the xed positive fraction of royalty revenues
Rt which is directly used for current consumption. The value of  would be pinned down
by the institutional agreement between national and regional authorities. Hence, regional
authorities can not deviate unilaterally from it. Notice that the positive fraction  of the
royalties destined to current consumption implies in any case a less conservative policy than
the one prescribed by the BWF in (2).
The second term is given by 

govt 1
yt 1

, and it implies an additional variable fraction
of the royalty revenues which is a function of the ratio between the previous years regional
government expenditure govt 1 and regional real GDP yt 1.  > 0 is a positive coe¢ cient
indicating the relative weight given from policymakers to this second term. The economic
intuition is the following: in times of recession/booms, for y low/high (and for a given
expenditure gov), the high/low ratio gov
y
shows the need for a higher/lower fraction of royalty
revenues destined to sustain the regional governments current expenditure. In other words,
the variable fraction of royalty revenues implied by 

govt 1
yt 1

functions as an economic
stabilizer for the budget of the regional authorities. Note that the level of the coe¢ cient
 should as well be pinned down by the institutional agreement between the national and
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the regional authorities, together with . The total fraction of the royalty revenues destined
to current expenditure (i.e., the term given by
h
 + 

govt 1
yt 1
i
 1, will instead not be
possible to predict with precision (and hence not possible to negotiate), as it varies with
yearly changes in the ratio gov
y
.
As it was the case for the previous scal rule given by the BWF, the term
 
r
1+r

Amt in
(9) represents the annuity value of the nancial wealth already accumulated in the fund.
Let us present the fund dynamics for the case of the mixed rule. The formulation of the
scal spending rule gmt in (9) can be inserted back into (1) so to obtain:
Amt+1 = A
m
t + (1 + r)

1     

govt 1
yt 1

Rt: (10)
which implies a fund dynamics similar to (6), without the total fraction of royalty revenues
destined to current consumption and given by
h
 + 

govt 1
yt 1
i
. In conclusion, notice that
the mixed rule corresponds to a general version of the scal rules in (3) and (2). For  = 1
and  = 0, no royalty revenues are invested and stored in the BWF fund, hence (9) would
give back (3). For  = 0 and  = 0, (9) would be again equal to (2).
Practices of resource funds
This subsection focuses mostly on a resource fund case study at the country level. The
relevancy of a national sovereign wealth fund case for the resource policy proposal of this
paper relies on the possibility that such a national framework be translated to a within-
country institutional setting. The Norwegian experience will be given a prominent role in
this subsection, as a benchmark framework in order to highlight the practices of establishing
and running a sovereign wealth fund.
The Norwegian experience with management of petroleum resources and more precisely
the history of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) has been analyzed by CANER
and GRENNES (2010), HARDING and VAN DER PLOEG (2013) and HOLDEN (2013).
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The proposal of establishing a wealth fund in order to store resource revenues for future
generations of citizens dates back as far as 1983, when the "Tempo Utvalg" (which stands
for "Speed Committee" in Norwegian, referred to the velocity of the extraction process).
However, it took more a decade of parliamentary debate before the fund was actually estab-
lished, in 1996. The establishment of a regional wealth fund at the sub-national level in Italy
might partially borrow from the Norwegian experience, however it is important to point out
that a new institutional framework should be designed, tailored to the new within-country
context. As the Norwegian wealth fund is a state owned fund independently administered
by the Norwegian central bank, the BWF could be established as a regionally owned fund
independently administered by the central bank of Italy, under a specic and transparent
regulatory framework. This framework does not di¤er substantially from the current institu-
tional framework, in which the region of Basilicata receives from the Italian state the 100%
of the royalty revenues paid from extracting companies on the value of the oil extracted
(IACONO, 2015).
At the beginning, the Norwegian wealth fund did not comprise an ad hoc spending
rule, hence the national government was spending ahead of both current and future oil
revenues (this consumption pattern can be theoretically justied by the Permanent Income
Hypothesis, as developed in IACONO, 2012). In 2001, the ad hoc scal spending rule
based on the annuity value of the nancial wealth allocated in the fund was introduced,
and since then Norwegian government authorities have been roughly spending each year a
4% of the funds accumulated wealth. The size of the fund was approximately 290% of the
Norwegian GDP at the end of 2014 (NBIM, 2014). The previous section has proposed for
the BWF a scal spending rule based on the Norwegian experience, although the interest
rate determining the annuity value should be tailored to the size of the BWF and to the
necessity of the Basilicata region.
Two examples of within-country resource funds should also be mentioned in this sub-
section, namely the experiences of the Canadian province of Alberta and of the U.S. federal
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state of Alaska. The rst lesson that can be derived from these two experiences is that,
although both Canada and U.S. imply a context of stronger scal federalism than that of
Italy, they have demonstrated the viability of the policy of establishing a resource fund at
the sub-national level. The second lesson, mostly derived from the fund in Alaska, is that
public distribution of dividend from the funds is an additional policy tool that can be im-
plemented if the scope is to bypass the government apparatus. A detailed overview of the
resource fundsexperiences in Alberta and Alaska can be found in BAENA et al. (2012).
In conclusion, some political economy considerations. The economics literature on the
management of natural resources (surveyed in DEACON, 2012) has indicated that the ef-
cacy of the use of resource windfalls depends crucially on the quality of institutions. For
instance, lack of strong institutions can lead to higher corruption, as in BROLLO et al.
(2013), and determine a sub-optimal exploitation of the resource windfalls. The establish-
ment of the BWF responds precisely to this recommendation, by avoiding that the quality
of the local institutions (i.e., the regional authorities in power) inuences to a large extent
the spending path of the royalty revenues. On the other hand, the quality of institutions at
the national level would still play a key role when it comes to designing the BWF, pinning
down the rules of the game and being responsible of the supervision of the BWF.
Simulation of the spending rules
This section aims at showing how the BWF would function in practice, by calibrating
the analytical framework described above in (1-9) to the actual series of royalty revenues Rt
received from the Basilicata region, from 1997 to 2014. Once the series for the fund dynamics
from (6) has been simulated inserting the actual series of royalty revenues Rt, it will be then
possible to compare the consumption series for the actual spending rule (3) with the BWF
spending rule (2), and with the mixed spending rule (9).
In order to show the di¤erent dynamics for the scal spending rules in the post-depletion
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era, it is assumed for simplicity that resource depletion happens at T = 2015z. The full time
range of the simulation exercise is 1997 2050, hence including both a pre- and post-depletion
period. First, let us plot the time series for the actual scal spending rule gt = Rt, which
reects the actual royalty revenues Rt (constant 1996 Euros, millions):
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Figure1: Actual spending rule, Euros, millions
As it can be seen from Figure 1, the highly volatile series of the actual royalty revenues
increases substantially from the end of the 1990s; from T = 2015 onward, scal consumption
for the regional government drops however to null as a consequence of depleted resources and
absence of royalty revenues. The actual royalty revenue series transferred from the Italian
state to the Basilicata region for the period 1997  2014 has been retrieved from UNMIGx.
The next step is simulating the series Abwft for the BWF as given in (6), which is a
function of actual royalty revenues Rt and which incorporates the scal spending rule g
bwf
t
given in (2){. The constant net interest rate is assumed to be r = [0:02; 0:04; 0:06], which is
zAlternatively, depletion could have been assumed to take place in the medium to long run. To do so, it
would have been necessary to specify a theoretical model for the resource income from which royalty revenues
are derived.
xRoyalties transfers in Euros were provided by UNMIG (Italian Ministry of Economic De-
velopment, General Direction for Energy and Mineral resources) and are available online at
http://unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/.
{Time series obtained from the simulation exercise are available from the author upon request.
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a set of values that takes into account the BWFs administration costs and ination. The
time series for the BWF can be plotted as follows:
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Figure 2: BWF assets, Euros, millions
As it is shown in Figure 2, allocation of royalty revenues to the BWF drives the expo-
nential growth of nancial wealth accumulated in Abwft until the depletion year, from which
the amount of wealth accumulated stays constant, as predicted in (7). This is due to the
fact that the rather conservative scal spending rule gbwft does not imply higher consumption
than the annuity value of the funds nancial wealth. Any deviation from such a rule in the
sense of higher current consumption of royalty revenues would imply a atter accumulation
of nancial wealth in the BWF.
The next step is to jointly plot the scal spending series given by the actual spend-
ing rule (3) from Figure 1 and the BWF spending rule (2) for each of the values in r =
[0:02; 0:04; 0:06], in order to evaluate the gap in consumption between them. The resulting
gure is:
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Figure 3: Actual vs. BWF rule, Euros, millions.
The joint plot of Figure 3 shows the gap between the di¤erent consumption dynamics
emerging from the actual spending rule and the ones based on the BWF. The gap in con-
sumption between the actual and the BWF rule is in any case positive and substantial in
the pre-depletion era, whilst it becomes negative in the post-depletion period. The absolute
value of these gaps is shown to be highly dependent on the level of the constant net interest
rate r. Another noteworthy feature of the BWF rule is that the consumption level monoton-
ically increases up to the stable post-depletion level; hence, no unexpected reductions in
the royalty revenues occur, as it is the case for the actual spending rule (dropping from a
2013 consumption level of approximately 145 millions Euros to null in 2015). This aspect
has political economy relevance, insofar as instantaneous expenditure reductions are not a
desired feature for the regional authorities.
Let us now proceed by introducing the mixed rule in the simulation exercise. As men-
tioned above, the target of the mixed rule is to provide the regional authorities with a rule
implying a lower degree of conservatism than the BWF rule, and which is as well a function
of the economic development of the region. In practice, this implies that the mixed rule will
allow a consumption level somewhere in between the actual and BWF rules (this applies to
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both in the pre and post-depletion era), with the gaps between these rules determined by
the level of the parameters  and . Figure 4 adds the mixed rule to the plot of Figure 3,
for the specic case of (r = 0:04;  = 0:2;  = 0:2):
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Figure 4: Actual vs. BWF vs. Mixed rule, Euros, millions.
As shown in Figure 4, the pre-depletion consumption level implied by the mixed rule is
strictly higher than the one implied by the more conservative BWF rule. On the contrary,
in the post-depletion period the BWF rule dominates the consumption level of the mixed
rule. As for the actual rule, the mixed rule implies a sudden reduction in consumption due
to depletion, although this reduction is less substantialk.
An important remark has to be made about the above simulation of the mixed rule. It
can be pointed out that the actual series for the regional expenditure govt and the regional
income yt employed to simulate the mixed rule in Figure 4 already includes the potential
growth e¤ect of royalty revenues up to the depletion year. In other words, in order to esti-
mate the causal e¤ect on consumption of setting up the BWF compared to using the actual
kNote that the dramatic reductions in consumption expenditure due to depletion in Figure 4 rely on our
assumption of unexpected depletion in 2015. In more realistic terms, a stock of non-exhaustible resources
will reach depletion gradually. In that case, the actual and the mixed rule would prescribe a monotonically
declining consumption series without jumps.
Data about regional government expenditure and income were retrieved from ISTAT - Conti e aggregati
economici territoriali, available at: http://dati.istat.it/. Accessed on the 12:11:2015:
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spending rule, regional expenditure and income series should be adjusted by subtracting the
estimated e¤ect of royalty revenues throughout the pre-depletion era. In order to take this
aspect into account, we have simulated di¤erent scenarios for the regional expenditure, the
regional income and the ratio between them. We can conclude that none of these simulations
delivered values for the ratio govt
yt
outside the range of values [0:25   0:34] which we obtain
by simply using the actual series, as done in Figure 4. In addition, the idea of using the
actual series of regional expenditure and regional income is based on the consensus from
the summary of the literature given in the introduction, pointing to the negligible e¤ect of
royalty revenues on regional growth in Basilicata up to recent years.
In conclusion, some sensitivity results were obtained by plotting the mixed rule for
di¤erent values for r;  and  (Figure 5 for the consumption series, and Figure 6 for the funds
assets, both in appendix). The scope is to show the combinations of consumption and funds
assets dynamics under the various parameterizations. Ultimately, the aim is to highlight a
set of feasible combinations of  and  that could be inserted in the institutional agreement
between national and regional authorities. For high values of  and  ( = 0:3;  = 0:3), the
total fraction of royalty revenues allocated to current consumption increases. Hence, higher
pre-depletion consumption allows the regional authorities to substantially invest in local
economic development policies in the short-run, however reducing the size of the fund (and
hence future consumption expenditure) in the medium to long run. In addition, the higher
pre-depletion consumption levels will be, the bigger the magnitude of the post-depletion
drop in consumption (and in the regional government expenditure) becomes. A thorough
evaluation of these aspects should be conducted in order to tailor the funds implication for
current and future consumption to the needs of economic policy nancing of the regional
authorities.
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Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper was to propose and evaluate a new resource policy for the oil-rich
southern Italian region of Basilicata. The resource policy developed consists of establishing
a regional wealth fund in order to store royalty revenues from exploitation of non-renewable
natural resources. In addition, the paper posited a transparent and clear-cut spending s-
cal rule to implement the fund, aiming to foster the long-run impact of resource revenues.
Deviations from the benchmark BWF rule were also conceived by the means of a mixed
rule, allowing larger spending in times of economic recession. A thorough simulation ex-
ercise presented an example regarding how the BWF would allow the regional government
of Basilicata to smooth consumption of the royalty revenues towards long-run economic
development objectives.
The greatest advantage from the creation of the BWF, paired with a scal spending rule,
is to increase the focus on long-run economic development and higher political accountability,
hence avoiding misuse of resource revenues for myopic scal spending. An additional novelty
aspect of the resource policy proposed in this paper, is that establishing a regionally owned
wealth fund administered by national authorities could be considered as an additional policy
option for other resource-rich regions in the world.
Further research on this issue could be carried on by conducting a welfare-based eval-
uation of the consumption gap between the di¤erent scal rules; or otherwise by narrowing
down the simulation exercise to an even more detailed calibration of the actual prole of the
Basilicata economy, in order to forecast the impact of the BWF on the economic develop-
ment of the region. In order to increase the accuracy of these forecasts, the royalty revenues
should explicitly be formulated as a function of the resource price, as to consider di¤erent
values for the variance of the resource income.
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Figure 5: Consumption dynamics, Mixed rule, Euros, millions.
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Figure 6: Assets dynamics, Mixed rule, Euros, millions.
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